The Italian Council of State rules on the issue of dominant firms' duty to supply essential information beyond the requirements of sector regulation (BCS) by A. Arena
e-Competitions
National Competition Laws Bulletin
May 2013-I
The Italian Council of State rules on the issue of
dominant firms' duty to supply essential
information beyond the requirements of sector
regulation (BCS)
Italy, Unilateral practices, Abuse of dominance, Essential facility, Access to
information, Judicial review, Pharmaceutical
Italian Council of State (Consiglio di Stato), 11 January 2013, n° 548, BCS
Amedeo Arena, e-Competitions | N° 51786, www.concurrences.com
Italy’s highest administrative court handed down an important ruling on the issue of the dominant
firms’ duty under Article 102 TFEU to grant their competitors access to essential information when
sector regulation encourages such a disclosure. By its judgment of 11 January 2013, no. 548 (the “
BCS judgment”), the Italian Council of State court upheld the decision of the Italian Antitrust
Authority (“IAA”) in the A415 - Sapec Agro / Bayer-Helmcase [1], which had imposed a fine of over
EUR 5 million on two companies of the Bayer Group, Bayer Cropscience AG and Bayer Cropscience
Ltd (“BCS”). The Council of State, giving final judgment on the matter, reversed an earlier decision
by the Latium Regional Administrative Court that had annulled the IAA Decision at first instance [2].
1. The IAA Decision.
Following a complaint by a competitor, the IAA had launched an investigation against BCS for an
alleged abuse of dominant position in the Italian market for fosetyl-based fungicides for the
treatment of grapevine downy mildew. The IAA found that BCS had put in place a complex strategy
to refuse certain competitors, members of the European Union Fosetyl-Aluminium Task Force (“the
Task Force”), access to the results of two toxicological studies on the effects of fosetyl, which, under
sector regulation, were necessary to obtain the renewal of marketing authorizations for generic
fungicides based on that active ingredient. According to the IAA, BCS’s conduct had resulted in the
withdrawal of 26 marketing authorizations, the exclusion of the Task Force from the relevant market,
an increase in BCS’s market share from 45% to 50-60%, a rise in average prices of fosetyl-based
fungicides of about 25%, and a reduction in the sales of those fungicides of about 3% [3].
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2. The substantive test applied by the Council of State.
To review BCS’s conduct, the Council of State applied a substantive test that seems to conflate the
refusal to license and essential facilities doctrines as articulated by EU courts. Just like the Court of
Justice did in Microsoft [4], the Council of State assessed whether: i) the dominant firm’s input was
indispensable to operate in a given market; ii) the refusal eliminated effective competition in that
market; iii) the refusal prevented the appearance of a new product; iv) the refusal was not
objectively justified. However, following the Court of Justice’s approach in Oscar Bronner [5], the
Council of State broke down the first prong of the test into two sub-prongs, i.e. the non-duplicability
and the non-substitutability of the input controlled by the dominant firm.
3. Indispensability of the input.
In Oscar Bronner the Court of Justice checked whether the same input (i.e. a nationwide
home-delivery scheme) could neither be duplicated by access-seekers nor be substituted with
alternative inputs [6]. In the BCSjudgment, instead, the Council of State looked at two different
inputs: first, it established whether the studies on fosetyl were duplicable by the Task Force, second,
it determined whether fosetyl could be replaced by other active ingredients for the production of
downy mildew fungicides.
The duplicability of the studies carried out by BCS proved a particularly controversial issue, both in
the proceedings before the IAA and before Italian administrative courts. In order to avoid duplicative
testing on vertebrate animals, sector regulation encouraged the sharing of test results among
competitors and laid down a consultation and arbitration procedure to that end. Nonetheless,
because of BCS’s obstructionist and dilatory tactics [7], the Task Force and BCS did not manage to
reach an agreement on access to the fosetyl studies. While the Lazio Regional Administrative Court
took the view that sector regulation merely discouraged the duplication of existing studies [8], the
Council of State upheld the IAA’s claim that replication of the experiments carried out by BCS was
prohibited, thus making access to those test results indispensable [9].
The Council of State’s assessment of the substitutability of fosetyl with other active ingredients
marks a clear divergence from the EU case law. While in Oscar Bronner the Court of Justice clearly
stated that the existence of “less advantageous” substitutes ruled out the indispensable character of
a given input [10], the Council of State found that the fosetyl studies were indispensable even
though alternative solutions would have allowed the Task Force companies to continue to operate in
the relevant market [11], albeit without “maintaining their current position and role” [12]. To
paraphrase a well-known commentary to the Microsoft case, the Council of State embraced a
doctrine of “convenient facilities”, rather than of “essential” ones [13].
4. The elimination of competition.
In its decision against BCS, the IAA provided a detailed analysis of the effects of BCS’s conduct on
that firm’s market share, on the Task Force, and on the prices and sales of fosetyl-based fungicides [
14]. On the contrary, the Council of State simply averred that BCS’s behaviour, in view of its clear
repugnancy with competition rules and its openly anti-competitive intent, had to be considered
illegal “irrespective of a finding of the existence … of harm to competition” [15].
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That finding, which implies a per se ban on some unilateral practices similar to that applying to
agreements restricting competition “by object” under Article 101 TFEU, not only appears at odds
with the effect-based reform of Article 102 TFEU advocated by the Commission for the last ten
years [16], but also deviates from the more conservative case law of the Court of Justice, according
to which the elimination, even potential, of effective competition is one of the prongs that must be
met for a refusal to license claim to succeed [17].
5. The obstacle to the introduction of a new product.
The prong in question constitutes the raison d’être of the antitrust prohibition on refusal to license:
the encroachment on the IP rights of the dominant firm and the reduction of incentives to innovate
resulting from the imposition of a duty to license are only justified if obtaining that license enables
other firms to introduce new products or services, which the dominant firm does not offer and for
which there is a potential demand [18]. As explained in IMS Health, this is not the case if the
license-seeker “intend[s] to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already
offered on the secondary market by the owner of the intellectual property right” [19]. Yet, in the
instant case it was undisputed that the Task Force had requested access to BCS’s studies to obtain
the renewal of their marketing authorizations for generic fosetyl-based fungicides, i.e. products
already offered on the market and entirely equivalent to BCS’s own fungicides [20].
Admittedly, the prong concerning the obstacle to the introduction of a new product had been
significantly watered down by the Court of First Instance in its judgment in Microsoft, where it
stated that the refusal to license may constitute an abuse of dominant position even if it merely has a
negative impact on the incentives to innovate for the dominant firm’s competitors [21]. However,
while the Commission had provided ample evidence of the effects of Microsoft’s refusal on its
competitors’ investment in innovation (for example, by comparing their investment behaviour before
and after the refusal) [22], the IAA merely claimed that the development of new-generation
fungicides would have been “likely” if the Task Force had been allowed to remain on the market [23
].
The Council of State, in turn, espoused an even broader understanding of the obstacle to the
introduction of a new product prong, by taking the view that, from the perspective of the Task Force,
the renewal of existing marketing authorizations for their generic fungicides was “equivalent to
obtaining a marketing authorization for a new product” [24]. This approach, which unduly expands
the notion of “new product”, seems to deprive the prong in question of all practical significance and
may substantially chill innovation in industries, such as pharmaceuticals and plant protection
products, where interactions between antitrust and IP law are manifold and frequent [25].
6. The absence of objective justifications.
In the course of the proceedings before the IAA, BCS had pleaded that its refusal to grant access to
the studies was necessary to protect its IP rights [26]. The Court of First Instance had already
rejected a similar justification in Microsoft, noting that, if the mere fact of holding IP rights could in
itself constitute an objective justification, refusal to license could never be contrary to Article 102
TFEU [27].
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In the proceedings before the Latium Regional Administrative Court, therefore, the analysis of
possible justifications had also extended to BCS’s allegations of negligence on the part of the Task
Force in taking the steps laid down by sector regulation to obtain access to the test results. The
Council of State, however, eventually ruled that the purported negligence of BCS’s competitors did
not “erase the anticompetitive character” of the dominant firm’s conduct [28].
7. Conclusions.
The prerogative of the holder of an IP right to exploit it to its own exclusive advantage is the very
subject-matter of that exclusive right [29], which the legal system acknowledges and upholds to
reward the creation of original works and the development of innovative technologies [30]. The
imposition of a compulsory license, even in return for a reasonable price, leads to a reduction in the
incentives to innovate both for the right holder (by discouraging further investment in research) and
for its competitors (by sanctioning free-riding), thus harming consumer welfare in the long run [31].
For this reason, EU courts, and even more so their American counterparts, [32] have proved rather
cautious in imposing licensing obligations on dominant firms, by requiring evidence either of the
“exceptional circumstances” outlined in Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft [33] or of “certain abusive
conduct” such as that described in Volvo and Renault [34].
The Council of State in the BCSjudgment took the opposite perspective, by characterising the duty
to share essential information with competitors as a corollary of the “special responsibility” borne by
all dominant firms, subject to requirements that appear a watered-down version of the Microsoft
prongs. [35] In particular, by espousing an overly broad understanding of the “new product” prong,
the Council of State appeared willing to forego the dominant firm’s incentives to innovate without
requiring any proof of countervailing potential innovation by access-seekers. [36]
The Council of State’s assessment of the facts of the case might have been influenced by the fact
that BCS had maliciously circumvented the procedure laid down by sector regulation for the sharing
of test results, thus eventually leading the Task Force to carry out its own experiments. Nevertheless,
while the existence of a regulatory duty to deal might lower the burden of proof required for the
imposition of an obligation to supply under Article 102 TFEU, [37] the use of competition law to fix
the loopholes in sector regulation by requiring a conduct that regulation merely sought to encourage
appears a bridge too far, as it may undermine legal certainty and chill innovation thereby harming
consumers in the long run.
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